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Abstract
A stylised fact from the large and growing literature on relationships between trade and growth 
is that liberal trade policies may stimulate growth. However, there is no academic consensus that 
liberal trade policies are either necessary or sufficient ingredients in growth promoting policies. 
In this paper, the relationships between trade policy and growth are investigated. The paper adds 
some new findings.  My measure of trade policy is not only applied average tariff rates which 
have been used by others, but such tariff rates for agriculture and manufacturing separately. The 
results indicate opposite results of the two: Protection of manufacturing correlates negatively 
with growth, while tariffs on agriculture imports seem to have a weaker though positive correla-
tion. These results are robust in the sense that they remain significant with the same sign indepen-
dently of different specifications and inclusions of various control variables. 
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Trade and growth – again 

1. Introduction 
Do liberal trade policies foster growth and development, or should, or 
could, protectionism and tariffs constitute ingredients in growth-
promoting policies? Questions like these have been debated inten-
sively in recent years. This is so in economics and among the general 
public. The fact that economists disagree on these issues, despite cen-
tury-long theorising and hundreds of advanced empirical studies 
available, suggests important challenges for the research discipline. 
 
Textbook economics suggests that countries should engage in trade. 
The theories of comparative advantages and the ‘new trade theory’ 
almost unanimously conclude that international trade promotes mutual 
benefits for the trading partners. But apart from such simple theoris-
ing, economics of trade, growth or development do not conclude 
clearly on these issues. A very short review of some issues is given in 
section 2 below.  
 
Neither are the data clear. The recent surge of empirical literature on 
relationships between trade and growth reflects challenges for empiri-
cal research. Even after renewed energy has been devoted to these is-
sues, we still lack clear-cut conclusions. In their authoritative review 
of the literature, Durlauf et al. (2005) cite 18 studies (and refer to 20 
anonymous others) on the relationships between trade, trade policy 
and growth. According to Durlauf et al., ten studies report a positive 
and significant result, three a positive, non-significant result, six stud-
ies report unclear effects while six report negative (for which two 
were significantly so) correlations between various trade-related vari-
ables and economic development.1  
 
Consequently, one might conclude that the literature weakly suggests 
a (weakly) positive relationship between trade and growth. Rodriguez 
and Rodrik (1999) reject such a conclusion. They claim that several 
contributions to the literature wrongly conclude about a positive rela-
tionship. After scrutinising a sample of important papers, Rodriguez 
and Rodrik conclude that (p. 4) 
 
“Our bottom line is that the nature of the relationship between trade policy and 
economic growth remains very much an open question. The issue is far from 
having been settled on empirical grounds. We are in fact skeptical that there is a 
general, unambiguous relationship between trade openness and growth waiting 
to be discovered. We suspect that the relationship is a contingent one, dependent 
on a host of country and external characteristics.”  
 
Section 3 below does not aim at repeating the reviews (by Rodriguez 
and Rodrik and others) available. It does, however, discuss some of 
                                                 
1  Several studies report more than one result so there is no contradiction that more results 
than studies are reported.  
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the commonly used measures of trade policy and openness. The exist-
ing literature has used advanced econometric methodology to reveal 
openness. Simple data available have not been used to the same de-
gree. Tariff data have been used in some studies only. In this study, 
use is made of tariff data broken down on agriculture and manufactur-
ing.  
 
Section 4 discusses these data in some detail together with the other 
data used in this paper. The main empirical methodology is the stan-
dard one: In addition to standard and robust explanatory variables in 
cross-sectional growth studies, some new measures of trade policy are 
included. Thus, most of the data used in this paper are well known in 
cross-section economics on economic growth.   
 
Section 5 presents the findings. These suggest that when tariff data for 
manufacturing and agriculture are used separately, there is a negative, 
significant and robust relationship between tariffs in manufacturing 
and growth, while this is not the case for agriculture protectionism. 
These results survive a number of robustness checks and alternative 
specifications. Some evidence on interaction with variables reflecting 
governance and institutions (as suggested by Rodriguez and Rodrik) is 
also reported.  
 
Section 6 concludes.  
2. A short review of the literature 
Static models of comparative advantages give reasons for countries to 
engage in international trade. When countries specialise in producing 
the goods for which their domestic opportunity costs are the lowest, 
all countries may gain from trading with each other. Ricardian trade 
models suggest that international trade will increase welfare and factor 
rewards. Resource-based trade theory in the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition 
explains how trade may give rise to distributional conflicts. Still trade 
is predicted to be mutually beneficial for all countries in the sense that 
gains for winners in each country potentially can more than compen-
sate losers in the same country. Theories about international trade are 
summarised in many textbooks. See e.g. Krugman and Obstfeld 
(2009) or Feenstra (2004)  
 
Static models based on increasing returns, i.e. so-called ‘new trade 
theories’, similarly most often predict mutual gains from trade. When 
there are increasing returns, prices will be lower and product variety 
larger if countries specialise in producing few product varieties that 
are sold in several markets and exchange goods with other countries, 
rather than producing for their domestic markets only. But, in some 
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models, market size may be decisive for localisation choices. Increas-
ing returns combined with trade costs stimulate localisation of produc-
tion where markets are large. Firms may choose to locate where they 
have the highest market access. Therefore, international trade may in 
some instances disproportionally benefit large countries. De-
industrialisation in small countries may occur. In terms of welfare, 
theory still often predicts gains from trade also for de-industrialised 
countries. The reason is that trade causes product prices to decline and 
therefore higher real wages. When there is migration of factors of pro-
duction, de-industrialisation is more likely since market size becomes 
endogenous. These types of theories are summarised by Feenstra 
(2004), Dixit and Norman (1980) and Fujita et al. (1999). In many 
ways, these new trade theories give support to, and formalisation of, 
older theoretical approaches proposed by among others Kaldor (1972), 
Myrdal (1957) and Posner (1961).  
 
Standard neoclassical growth models do not suggest dynamic growth 
effects from international trade (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1998, ch. 
11). Thus, growth and trade are often analysed separately in traditional 
neoclassical theorising. Capital accumulation leads to higher capital 
intensity which translates into lower returns from capital. Therefore, 
there will be income-level convergence in the neoclassical growth sto-
ry. In case of resource-based international trade, factor price equalisa-
tion may speed up convergence of income levels.  
 
Ventura (1997) argues that trade and growth are necessarily interre-
lated, however.  When there is international trade, capital accumula-
tion allows specialisation in more capital- intensive industries. Thus, 
decreasing returns to capital may occur slowly and for each industry 
as the result of global savings only (rather than accumulation of capi-
tal in each individual country). High growth may therefore result from 
accumulation even over longer periods, since decreasing returns from 
capital are counteracted by changing industrial structures. Ventura ex-
plains how such mechanisms can be important for growth miracles 
observed for instance in East Asia.  
 
When countries have specialised according to e.g. comparative advan-
tages and take part in international trade, they will benefit differently 
both from domestic economic growth and from growth in other coun-
tries. Some countries may experience negative terms of trade effects 
from growth in foreign countries if they are specialised in industries 
with low income elasticities. Also domestic growth in such industries 
may lead to deteriorating terms of trade and lower income. This is the 
case of ‘immiserising growth’ described by Bhagwati (1958). Closely 
related is the idea that developing countries may lose from trade if 
they are specialised in for instance agricultural production with low 
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income elasticities (Prebisch, 1959). On the other hand, being special-
ised in industries that do not experience falling prices and which have 
high income elasticities, often results in extraordinary benefits from 
being exposed to international trade.2 
 
Endogenous growth models demonstrate how trade may boost eco-
nomic growth for the global economy. The existence of international 
technology spillovers and larger markets often tend to reinforce posi-
tive growth effects of economic integrations (Helpman and Grossman, 
1991, Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991).  But endogenous growth mod-
els (as demonstrated by Lucas (1988) and Young (1991)) can explain 
the existence of low growth traps because of unfortunate specialisa-
tion. Countries specialise according to their static comparative advan-
tages. However, endogenous growth mechanisms may differ between 
industries. Therefore, some countries may be lucky and get specialised 
in industries with great promises for the future in the sense that endo-
genous growth is high. Other countries may become specialised in in-
dustries without such potentials.  
 
Matsuyama (1992) stresses another link between industrial structures, 
openness and development. The point of departure is the traditional 
view that there are decreasing returns in agriculture and increasing 
returns and endogenous growth in manufacturing. When there is endo-
genous growth, growth in productivity results more or less as an 
automatic by-product of production itself. Thus, productivity is the 
result of cumulated production experience in the industry. Endoge-
nous growth in manufacturing supports the view of manufacturing as 
an engine of growth.  
 
In the case of endogenous growth in manufacturing industries, open-
ness versus closedness may be decisive for the consequences of pro-
ductivity growth in the agricultural sector. In the case of a closed eco-
nomy, there may be positive links between productivity growth in ag-
riculture and economic growth. The reasons are that productivity 
growth in agriculture 1) makes it possible to feed a growing manufac-
turing workers population, 2) releases labour for manufacturing em-
ployment and 3) increases supply of domestic savings to finance in-
vestments. In the case of an open economy, the links between agricul-
tural productivity and growth may be the opposite: High productivity 
in agriculture leads to specialisation in agriculture and de-
industrialisation. The reason is that countries without comparative ad-
vantages in agriculture may get a head start in manufacturing. With 
                                                 
2  Some raw-material-producing countries in recent years are prima facie evidence of this 
mechanism: Producing raw materials in periods of high growth in manufactured goods-
producing countries has proven to yield double dividends – increasing prices on exports 
goods (because of increasing prices of raw materials)  and decreasing prices on imports 
goods (because of high productivity growth in manufacturing). 
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learning-by-doing endogenous growth mechanisms, this may make it 
impossible to compete in manufacturing for countries that are special-
ised in agriculture.  
 
Rattsø and Torvik (2003) argue that the negative links between agri-
cultural productivity and growth in the open economy case may not 
necessarily be robust in a development economics perspective. When 
agricultural production is exported, such export earnings may be nec-
essary to finance imports of intermediates goods for a growing manu-
facturing sector. In this case, high growth in agriculture may be a nec-
essary condition for subsequent growth in the manufacturing sectors. 
According to this view, supportive policies for the agricultural sectors 
may make sense. Countries that are credit-rationed and have a large 
share of their export earnings from exports of agricultural goods may 
need to boost their exports from this sector in order to be able to im-
port intermediates for their manufacturing sectors.  
 
Based on a version of a similar modelling framework, Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (1999) argue for the opposite policy receipt: Manufacturing 
should be supported at the cost of agricultural production. Because of 
learning by doing in manufacturing, the optimal tariff for manufactur-
ing sectors may be positive. The reason is that such a tariff will in-
crease manufacturing employment, and therefore learning by doing, at 
the cost of agriculture employment where there is no learning by do-
ing.  
 
The modelling framework of the above two-sector models can easily 
be illustrated. Let XM denote manufacturing production and XA agri-
cultural production. Production functions are given by: 
 
 
Above, M denotes productivity in manufacturing and A denotes pro-
ductivity in agriculture; F and G are production functions with stan-
dard neoclassical properties and nt denotes the share of the workforce 
that is employed in manufacturing. Thus, production in the two sectors 
depends on the division of the working force between them. δ is a po-
sitive parameter.  
 
Agricultural productivity, A, is static (or has exogenous change). In 
the manufacturing sector there is endogenous growth in the learning-
by-doing sense so that productivity growth depends on production. 
This last property is described in equation 3.   
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Employment dynamics in the two sectors is determined by the equilib-
rium condition for the labour market where marginal returns from la-
bour in agriculture equal the marginal value of labour in manufactur-
ing: 
 
 
Above, pt is the price of manufacturing goods in terms of agricultural 
goods.  
 
Preferences are assumed non-homothetic and with an income elastic-
ity for food less than one. For the closed economy case, Matsuyama 
shows that under certain conditions these assumptions result in a stea-
dy state development path with a constant share of employment in 
each of the two sectors.   
 
In this steady state there is a constant growth rate for the manufactur-
ing sector. An exogenous productivity increase in agriculture releases 
employment to the manufacturing sector and thus results in permanent 
higher growth rates for this sector and for the economy. In the closed 
economy case, therefore, there is a positive link between agricultural 
productivity and economic growth.  
 
In the open economy case, however, the link between productivity in 
agriculture and manufacturing may be negative. In the open economy 
case, prices on the two goods produced in the economy are given from 
abroad. Thus the division of labour between agriculture and manufac-
turing, and therefore the growth rate in the economy (via 3), will be 
the result of relative prices on the world market. A positive productiv-
ity shock in agriculture draws employment away from manufacturing 
towards agriculture. This increases static welfare, but reduces growth 
over time. Thus, there is a negative link between productivity in agri-
culture and growth.  
 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) discuss the implications of imposing a 
tariff on manufactured goods. Such a tariff increases the domestic re-
lative price of manufactured goods and therefore manufacturing em-
ployment. For small tariffs, the effect on economic growth will be po-
sitive. For larger tariffs, distortionary effects dominate so that positive 
growth effects taper off. This is also a dynamic effect since it depends 
on the size of the manufacturing sector.  
 
As stated above, Rattsø and Torvik (2003) show that the negative link 
between agricultural productivity and growth for an open economy 
may not necessarily be present. They extend the production function 
   tttt nFMpnAG '1'        )4 
Trade and growth -- again  
 
11 
for manufacturing goods with a new factor (intermediates, I) in a 
Cobb-Douglas fashion. In the cases where agriculture exports finance 
imports of intermediate goods to be used in the manufacturing sector, 
manufacturing production may depend on productivity in agriculture. 
Intermediates have to be imported from other countries and such im-
ports are financed with exports of agricultural goods.  
 
The above discussion indicates that trade policy may play important 
roles for countries’ growth strategies. It is also demonstrated that sup-
portive policies may be appropriate both for manufacturing sectors 
and for agriculture. Thus, our discussion gives support for investigat-
ing the potential different impacts of protecting manufacturing versus 
agriculture.  
 
The above discussion shows how economic theories on trade and 
growth give scope for trade policy. Under certain circumstances, trade 
policy may stimulate economic growth. Messages from endogenous 
growth theories point in the direction of protecting manufacturing and 
industries with long-term growth potentials. But this is not an uncon-
ditional policy receipt. It depends, among other factors, on how ex-
posed an economy is to international trade. Thus, how to design trade 
policy to stimulate growth need not be obvious.  
 
In addition, of course, come all the political considerations on how to 
stimulate growth by means of trade policy rather than stimulating the 
needs of pressure groups and lobbyists. These are, however, consider-
ations beyond the scope of this short paper.  
3. Empirical strategies  
The contradicting findings in the literature surveyed by Durlauf et al. 
(2005) indicate that the relationships between growth, trade and trade 
policies are not obvious and they demonstrate a lack of academic con-
sensus. Figures 1 through 4 illustrate the ambiguities in the data. 
 
Those figures show simple scatter plots of (log of) income per capita 
in 1995 and (log of) trade as share of GDP in 1995 (figure 1), growth 
in income per capita (in the period from 1995 to 2005 and (log of) tra-
de as share of GDP (in 1995) (figure 2) and levels of and growth in 
income per capita versus average applied tariff rates (averaged over 
the period from 2000 to 2004) (figures 3 and 4). The data used to con-
struct the figures are described in section 4 below.  
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Figure 1 Income and trade 
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Figure 2 Growth and trade 
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Figure 3 Income and tariffs 
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Figure 4 Growth and tariffs 
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The relationships do not support any clear-cut conclusion. In particu-
lar, there is no clear relationships between openness (measured as tra-
de as share of GDP) and performance (income per capita and growth) 
while there seem to be weak negative correlations between perform-
ance and average tariff rates. The negative relationships are more pro-
nounced between income per capita and tariff rates than between 
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growth and tariff rates. Thus, from the correlations above, we do not 
find evidence that open countries are richer or grow faster than closed 
economies. Nor is there any clear evidence that countries with liberal 
trade policies do differently from countries that protect their indus-
tries. There is a weak negative relationship both between income per 
capita and tariffs and between growth and tariffs, but these are so 
weak that the figures alone cannot support clear conclusions.   
 
The lack of clear evidence has spurred a large literature. Some exam-
ples of this literature are mentioned below. These examples are chosen 
since they are often cited and since they employ different research 
strategies. A major research challenge has been how to measure open-
ness. The examples listed below show different choices. 
 
Edwards (1993,1998) gives a broad discussion of conceptual problems 
with measuring trade policies and openness. Openness as such, for 
instance measures such as trade as share of GDP, is one strategy. 
Above, it is demonstrated that this strategy does not reveal a clear re-
lationship. This does not mean that trade does not influence develop-
ment. First, also other variables influence on growth. A regression-
based methodology where more variables are included, is needed. Se-
cond, trade is also influenced by many variables. One is trade policy. 
Others are economic size, population and localisation. From the grav-
ity equation it is well known that trade depends on total income and 
bilateral distance between trading partners. Inclusion of trade as share 
of GDP (as in Edwards, Levine and Renelt (1992) and many others) 
cannot, therefore, be expected to measure the impact of trade policy 
on growth.  
 
Dollar (1992) constructs two indicators of openness. These are real 
exchange rate distortion and this indicator’s variability. Real exchange 
rate distortion is meant to reflect deviations from the law of one price 
and therefore deviations from free trade. This variable’s variability 
over time is also assumed to reflect lack of openness. Dollar suggests 
that these variables do reflect trade policies and the impacts of trade 
policies. Rodriguez and Rodrik, however, argue that both measures 
hardly reflect trade policies and that many other variables, including 
bad macroeconomic policy, will be captured by both variables.  
 
Edwards (1998) regresses growth in total factor productivity, TFP, on 
nine different measures of openness. He finds that several of these, 
among them trade as share of GDP, a composite openness indicator 
(see below), black market premiums and tariff rates all correlate nega-
tively with growth. Rodriguez and Rodrik argue that most of these 
findings are due to econometric misspecifications and inappropriate 
weighting (based on total GDP rather than real heteroscedasticity).  
Trade and growth -- again  
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The fact that many variables reflect openness motivated Sachs and 
Warner (1995) to try to construct a composite indicator of openness. 
Their indicator is a dichotomous variable that depends on six individ-
ual measures. A country was characterised as closed if any of five dif-
ferent criteria was fulfilled. These five are high tariff rates (above 40 
%), high coverage of non-tariff barriers, a socialist economic system, 
state monopoly for major exports and a high black market premium 
for foreign currencies. If none of these conditions were fulfilled, a 
country is classified as open. Sachs and Warner found positive and 
significant effects on growth rates of their openness indicator. Their 
result, however, was harshly criticised by Rodriguez and Rodrik. They 
claim that the result is explained by the impact of two of the indicators 
least related to trade policy (black market premium and state monop-
oly).  Wacziarg and Welch (2008) update and adjust the openness in-
dicator developed by Sachs and Warner. They find that liberalisation, 
i.e. shift from closed to open, stimulates growth. They are not, how-
ever, able to find clear and significant effects in cross-section regres-
sions. Wacziarg and Welch go a long way in controlling for spurious 
correlations in their panel data approach to the impact of trade liber-
alisation on growth. Such spurious correlations might arise, for in-
stance, because reform policy that stimulates growth also contains 
trade liberalisation that does not influence growth. Whether they suc-
ceeded with their controls has been the subject of debates.  
 
Trade is endogenous in the sense that it may itself influence growth 
but also be influenced by other factors that influence growth directly 
and independently of trade. Because of this, it may be that countries 
that experience high growth rates for some reasons are also observed 
to expand their trade even if there is no or just a weak causal relation-
ship. Therefore, researchers may be led to wrongly conclude that trade 
has a large and significant impact on growth. Some authors, such as 
e.g. Frankel and Romer (1999), have tried to construct measures of 
openness that take such endogeneity into account. The approach is to 
estimate expected trade. Variables that are known to influence on  
trade, but do not have clear relationships with growth, are used to esti-
mate trade. Thereafter, the effect of predicted trade on growth is esti-
mated.  Instruments for trade can for instance be geographical loca-
tion. Based on this methodology, Frankel and Romer find a large and 
robust positive, but not very significant, effect of trade on income lev-
els. 
 
In a similar vein, Romalis (2007) hypothesises that trade is influenced 
by market access in other countries. Romalis estimates the extent to 
which increased openness induced by greater market access caused 
faster growth in developing countries in the time-series and cross-
section dimension. He finds that market access seems to accelerate 
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growth. Romalis’ approach is that market access can possibly be a so-
lution to the endogeneity problem. Market access in other countries 
hardly reflects other domestic variables’ impact on growth. Therefore, 
Romalis argues, market access may reflect impact of trade on growth 
that does not correlate with other causes of economic growth. How-
ever, it may be that market access is one type of openness with its own 
effect on trade and growth apart from countries’ own trading policies. 
In trade policy debates, countries almost always demand increased 
market access in other countries. Thus, market access may well have 
separate effects on growth which differ from domestic trade policies. 
This is not discussed by Romalis. 
 
As is demonstrated above, very few of the studies in question use tar-
iff rates as such as their indicator for openness. The reasons for this 
are many.  
 
First, tariff data have not been readily available in standardised ver-
sions as computer- readable files. Now, however, the WTO (and other 
sources) gives access to different tariff data at different levels of ag-
gregation for many countries.  
 
Second, some countries have made use of a wide set of trade policy 
tools, of which tariffs are only one type. There are many trade policy 
tools, like non-tariff barriers, export subsidies and a large set of ‘red 
tape’ barriers. Thus, it is not certain that tariff barriers accurately re-
flect a country’s trade policy.  
 
Third, many countries discriminate between their trading partners. In 
recent years, many new regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been 
signed so that most favoured nations’ (MFN) average tariff rates actu-
ally may be atypical and applied to least favoured nations’ trading 
partners.  
 
Fourth, it is not always clear what tariff rates to use. Should one use 
applied tariff rates, bound tariff rates, MFN tariff rates, unweighted 
average tariff rates, weighted tariff rates etc.  
 
Fifth, the scatter plots of the relationships between tariffs and eco-
nomic performance above are indicative for many studies in this field: 
There is no evident correlation between tariff and growth. Our theo-
retical discussion above also warns against a priori expectations about 
such correlations.  
 
The fact that tariffs have been so seldom used in the literature can the-
refore easily be understood and defended. In this paper, however, we 
will use tariff rates as our main indicator for countries’ trade policy.  
Trade and growth -- again  
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4. The data 
The data used in this paper are standard data from the literature. Eco-
nomic variables for our cross section of countries are taken from the 
World Development Indicators. The period chosen is for 1995 to 
2005. The reasons for this are threefold: First, 1995 is a natural start-
ing year for the recent period of globalisation. The results of the Uru-
guay round were being introduced from 1995 onwards with estab-
lishment of the WTO. In 1995 the transition shock for the post-
communist countries was over (though many transition problems re-
main). Second, many more observations are available from 1995 on-
wards as compared to inclusion of earlier year. Restricting the period 
to the period from 1995 onwards therefore results in a larger cross-
section dataset. Third, with the establishment of the WTO more stan-
dardised tariff data became available. Restricting our focus to the post 
1995 period therefore allows a more consistent and larger data set. 
 
The data included in the below growth regressions are the most com-
mon ones included in cross country growth regressions. They are tho-
se that were deemed robust by Levine and Renelt (1992). They are 
standard variables when one wants to test for inclusion of other vari-
ables (like tariff data in this respect).3 The data included are gross do-
mestic product per capita in purchasing power parities in 1995, its av-
erage annual growth rate in the period to 2005, population and average 
annual population growth, annual gross fixed capital formation (aver-
aged over the period) and average secondary school attendance. In 
some of the regressions also trade (exports plus imports) share of GDP 
are included.  
 
Average applied tariff data, for all goods and for manufacturing and 
agriculture separately (and much more) are available from the WTO 
for the most recent years. The data used in this paper, however, are 
taken from the World Trade Indicators. These are documented in the 
user guide for the project (World Bank, 2008) and both the paper and 
the data are downloadable from the World Bank’s webpage. 
 
The data for governance indicators stem from the World Governance 
Indicator project (also available from the World Banks webpage). 
These indicators are presented and discussed by Kaufmann et al. 
(1999a, 1999b, 2004) and in Maurseth (2009). These indicators are six 
individual indicators of governance. The six different indicators re-
flect the quality of governance along different dimensions. They are 
constructed on the basis of a massive aggregation exercise of many 
individual governance measures. Since tariff data are hardly inde-
                                                 
3  But the art and science of which variables to include and which to exclude in regressions 
like those reported in tables 1 and  2, are controversial. Also see Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(1997) and Sala-I-Martin (1997).  
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pendent of governance quality, controlling for independent effects and 
interactions effects make sense. In this paper, Governance Effective-
ness and Control of Corruption were chosen to be included as addi-
tional control. These were the variables (of the six) that influenced the 
results the most. The two governance variables rank countries on a 
scale from -2,5 to 2,5 and they are approximately normally distrib-
uted. 4 
 
Table A in the appendix presents a summary of the data of prime in-
terest.   
5. Results 
Table 1 reports results from cross country growth regressions. The 
first column in table 1 is for well known and well recognised explana-
tory variables. These are (log of) initial income (lgdpc95), investment 
shares of GDP in terms of gross fixed capital formation averaged over 
the period (agfc), average secondary school enrolment in the begin-
ning of the period (avgsec) and population growth (pgrowth).5 It is 
seen that the regression results are ‘respectable’ in the sense that ex-
planatory power is acceptable and that the variables enter with ex-
pected signs and significance.  
 
 
                                                 
4  In some contributions, inclusion of another variable from the six WGI indicators, Rule of 
Law, has been proposed (see e.g Sala-I-Martin, 1997). This is obviously relevant for 
cross-country growth regressions. Here, however, I stuck to Governance Effectiveness and 
Control of Corruption since they produce some interaction effect with the tariff data.  
5  The reason why population growth is included is that it follows from neoclassical growth 
modelling. Taking growth rates of a Cobb-Douglas production function gives this result 
directly. Inclusion of population growth reduces the effect of tariff rates in this paper. It 
therefore also serves as check for the main hypothesis in this paper.  
Trade and growth -- again  
 
19 
Table 1 
 
Growth Regression 
1 
Regression 
2 
Regression 
3 
Regression 
4 
Regression 
5 
Lgdpc95 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
Pgrowth -0.399*** -0.400*** -0.378*** -0.375*** -0.396*** 
Agfc 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0008* 0.0007* 
Avgsec 0.0003** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0003** 
Avg tariff  -0.0004    
Avg agri tariff   0.0001 0.0001  
Avg man tariff   -0.0006** -0.0006*  
Ltrade95    0.0001 0.000 
N 127 127 127 124 124 
R2 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.37 
 
***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. All 
significance results are reported for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
 
In the second column, the effects of including average applied tariff 
rates are reported. It is seen that the other variables keep their sign and 
significance and that tariff rates enter with a negative although insig-
nificant sign. The p-value is 0.16.  
 
The third column presents the main finding in this paper. The regres-
sion shows that including tariff rates on manufacturing and agriculture 
separately changes the results. In this case, the sign of tariff rates in 
agriculture is positive, but insignificant. The p-value is 0.17. The coef-
ficient for manufacturing tariff rates, however, is negative and clearly 
significant (p-value of 0.039). The two last columns show the effect of 
including trade shares, either additionally to tariff rates or without in-
clusion of tariffs. The results do not lend support to inclusion of this 
simple indicator of openness (p-value higher than 0.9). Note that in-
clusion of trade shares does not change the result for the two separate 
average tariff rates included.  
 
Table 2 reports results that check robustness of the above results. The 
first two columns report results from inclusion of two separate meas-
ures of governance (control of corruption and governance quality) in 
addition to the variables included in column 3 in table 1. The next two 
columns show results from interacting these governance indicators 
with our measures of trade policy.  The reason for inclusion of gov-
ernance indicators is that trade policies may very well correlate with 
other types of policies.6 Therefore, it may be that the estimated effect 
of trade policies reflects effects of quality of governance in general 
rather than of trade policies.  
 
                                                 
6  Inclusion of both corruption and governance, however, resulted in a series of non-
significant variables.  
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Table 2 
 
Growth Regression 
1 
Regression 
2 
Regression 
3 
Regression 
4 
Regression 
5 
Lgdpc95 -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.007* 
Pgrowth -0.372*** -0.557*** -0.369*** -0.570*** -0.373*** 
Agfc 0.0008* 0.0010** 0.0007* 0.0009** 0.0008* 
Avgsec 0.000** 0.0001 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0002* 
Avg agri tariff 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0025* 
Avg man tariff -0.0006** -0.0003 -0.0008** -0.0005 -0.0001 
Governance -0.0008  0.0015   
Control of corr  0.0012  0.005*  
Agrita*gov   -0.0002   
Manuta*gov   -0.0000   
Agrita*corr    -0.0002  
Manuta*corr    -0.0001  
Agrita*lgdpc     -0.000 
Manuta*lgdpc     -0.0002* 
N 127 116 127 116 127 
R2 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.36 
 
***, ** and * denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. All 
significance results are reported for heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
 
 
Partly, this seems to be the case. When control of corruption is in-
cluded in the regression, trade policy variables are not significant. But 
neither is control of corruption significant. Thus, control of corruption 
seems to correlate with trade policies so that their individual effects 
are indiscernible. The sign of the estimated coefficients remain how-
ever. They remain and stay significant when quality of governance 
rather than control of corruption is included in the regression. When 
interaction terms with governance (regression 3) are included, signifi-
cance is higher than when these are left out. The opposite is the case 
when trade policy is interacted with control of corruption (regression 
4). Still, the sign of the estimated coefficients remains.  
 
The main finding in the paper is the effects of splitting the tariff vari-
able in tariffs on agriculture and tariffs on manufactured goods. The 
results indicate opposite effects of the two. Protection of manufactur-
ing does not seem to correlate positively with growth in the cross sec-
tion of countries used here. The sign of the estimated coefficient is 
negative and significant in most specifications. Protection of agricul-
ture, on the other hand, correlates positively (although with varying 
significance) with growth.   
 
One possible objection to the results reported here is that protection of 
agriculture is a kind of luxury goods for rich countries. Most rich 
countries protect their agriculture to some degree. In fact, the correla-
tion between average tariff rates in agriculture and income per capita 
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is positive, but low (0.02). But the interaction term with income per 
capita included in regression 5 does not give support to the objection. 
Richer countries have a more negative effect from protecting their 
manufacturing sectors, while there is no interaction effect between 
income per capita and protection of agriculture.  
6. Conclusions 
The findings reported in this paper are based on direct use of tariff 
data as indicator of trade policy. In the recent surge of empirical stud-
ies of relationships between growth and trade policy, such data have 
seldom been used. Instead many studies use a wide set of different 
measures of openness. From our review of theory of trade and growth, 
arguments for treating protective measures in different industries sepa-
rately arose. Endogenous growth mechanisms may generally differ 
between different industries and between manufacturing and agricul-
ture in particular. This paper adds to the literature by using average 
applied tariff rates in agriculture and manufacturing separately. This 
should be seen as a first step only. For more robust conclusions, more 
research on these topics is necessary. Therefore, we also hesitate in 
drawing clear policy conclusions. We have demonstrated different 
growth effects from protection of manufacturing and agriculture and 
possible interaction effects with development levels.  
A. Appendix 
 
Table A1. Summary statistics  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of obs 127    
growth 2.45 2.23 -3.50 8.95 
gdpc95 8110.46 8536.34 548.19 37747.00 
pgrowth 2.62 2.25 -2.35 10.16 
agfc 21.37 5.29 9.14 50.90 
avgsec 69.63 32.79 6.61 144.22 
     
mfnapp0004 11.04 6.48 0.00 31.80 
mfnaapp0004 17.86 12.17 0.10 93.90 
mfnnapp0004 10.01 6.48 0.00 32.60 
mfnnapp0004 10.01 6.48 0.00 32.60 
trade95 76.90 38.86 16.93 213.33 
 
 
 
Per Botolf Maurseth 22 
Literature 
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1998) Endogenous Growth Theory MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-I-Martin (1995) Economic Growth Mc Graw-
Hill Inc., New York.  
Bhagwati, J. (1958) “Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note” Re-
view of Economic Studies, 25, 201-205.  
Dixit, A. K. and V. Norman (1980) Theory of International Trade 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Dollar, D. (1992) “Outward-oriented Developing Economies Really 
Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-1985” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 39, 523-544.  
Durlauf, S. N., P. A. Johnson and J. R. W. Temple (2005) “Growth 
Econometrics” in Aghion, P. and S. N. Durlauf (eds.) Handbook of 
Economic Growth Vol. Ia, Ch. 8 , 555-677. Elsevier, North Hol-
land, Amsterdam.  
Edwards, S. (1998) “Openness, Productivity and Growth” The Eco-
nomic Journal 108, 383-398. 
Grossman, G, and E. Helpman (1991) Innovation and Growth in the 
Global Economy MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
Feenstra, R. C. (2004) Advanced International Trade – Theory and 
Evidence Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.  
Frankel, J., A. and D. Romer (1999) “Does Trade Cause Growth?” 
American Economic Review 89 (3) 379-399.  
Fujita, M., P. R. Krugman and A. Venables (1999) The Spatial Econ-
omy MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
Kaldor, N. (1972) “The case for regional policies” In N. Kaldor (ed) 
Further Essays on Economic Theory Holmes and Meier Publish-
ers, New York.   
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobatón (1999a) Aggregating 
Governance Indicators , Policy Research Working Paper 2195, 
World Bank (available at  
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/resources.htm) 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Labatón (1999b) Governance 
Matters  Policy Research Working Paper 2196, World Bank 
(available at  
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/resources.htm) 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2004) “Governance Mat-
ters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002” 
The World Bank Economic Review 18, 2, 253-287. 
Krugman, P. and M. Obstfeld (2009) International Economics – The-
ory and Policy 8th ed, Pearson Addison Wesley, Boston.  
Lucas, R. E. (1988) “ On the mechanics of economic development” 
Journal of Monetary Economics , 22, 3-43.  
Trade and growth -- again  
 
23 
Levine, R., and D. Renelt (1992) “A sensitivity analysis of cross-
country growth regressions” American Economic Review 82 (4) 
942-963.  
Matusyama, K. (1992) “Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Ad-
vantage and Economic Growth”, Journal of Economic Theory 58, 
317-334.  
Maurseth, P. B. (2008) Governance Indicators: A Guide. NUPI Work-
ing Paper No 754.  
Myrdal, G. (1957) Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions 
Duckworth, London.  
Posner, M. V. (1961) “International trade and technical change” Ox-
ford Economic Papers 13, 323-341.  
Prebisch, R. (1959) “Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped 
Countries,” American Economic Review 49 251–273. 
Rattsø, J. and R. Torvik (2003) “Interactions between Agriculture and 
Industry: Theoretical Analysis of the Consequences of Discrimi-
nating Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa” Review of Development 
Economics 7, 1, 138-151.  
Rivera-Batiz, L. and P. Romer (1991) “Economic Integration and En-
dogenous Growth” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 531-555. 
Rodriguez, F. and D. Rodrik (1999) “Trade policy and economic 
growth: A skeptic’s guide to the cross-national evidence” NBER 
Working Paper No 7081, Cambridge, Massachusetts.    
Romalis, J. (2007) Market Access, Openness and Growth NBER 
Working Paper, 13048.  
Sala-I-Martin (1997) “I Just Ran Two Million Regressions” American 
Economic Review, 87 (2) Papers and Proceedings, pp. 178-183.  
Sachs, J. D. and A. Warner (1995) “Economic Reform and the Process 
of Global Integration” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
1,1-118.  
Young (1991) “Learning by doing and the dynamic effects of interna-
tional trade” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 369-406. 
Ventura, J. (1997) “Growth and Interdependence” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 112 (1) 57-84.  
Wacziarg, R. and K. H. Welch (2008) “Trade Liberalisation and 
Growth: New Evidence” The World Bank Economic Review 22, 2, 
187-231.  
World Bank (2008) World Trade Indicators – User Guide available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/wti2008/docs/userguide.pdf 
 
